Abstract: Latino-majority congressional districts are far more likely to elect Latino representatives to Congress than majority-white districts. However, not all majority-Latino districts do so. This paper addresses this question and it investigates how the level of influence of political parties and interest groups in majority-Latino districts substantially shape Latino representation to the U.S. House of Representatives. I rely on five case studies and a dataset of candidates to open congressional races with a Latino population plurality from 2004-2014. The evidence indicates that groups and political networks are critical for Latino/a candidate recruitment, the organization of resources in a congressional district, the deployment of campaign resources on behalf of certain candidates and the eventual success of Latino candidates. The findings suggest that Latino descriptive and substantive representation are shaped by the wielding influence of political parties and interest groups.
Introduction
Despite being a majority-Latino district, with a 77% Latino population, Texas' 29th congressional district is currently represented by Rep. Gene Green (D), a non-Latino. Rep.
Greene was elected to this district as it became an open-seat in 1992. Greene finished second in a 5-way Democratic primary, behind City Councilman Ben Reyes. However, in the general election, Greene defeated Reyes by 180 votes. Since then, Rep. Greene has won re-election and no Latino candidate has been able to successfully unseat him.
On the other hand, Illinois' 4th congressional district, whose constituency is 70% Latino, is currently represented by Rep. Luis Gutierrez (D). In 1992, Gutierrez won a four-way primary in this newly-drawn district. He moved on to successfully defeat his Republican opponent, and he has won re-election every cycle since he entered office. The tale of these two majority-Latino districts begs an important question. How are some majority-Latino districts, like Illinois' 4 th , able to successfully elect a Latino to Congress, and congressional districts such as Texas' 29th unable to do so?
Most of the literature on Latino representation focuses on the role of voters and candidate characteristics. As such, this body of scholarship holds that demographics in majority-minority districts are largely responsible for the manifestation of co-ethnic descriptive representation (Lublin 1999; Branton 2009; Casellas 2011; Preuhs and Juenke 2011) . However, largely understudied in this scholarship is the role of political parties and interest groups. While there is a long-established literature that examines the role of groups, parties and elites in determining candidate emergence (Herrnson 1988; Herrnson and Gimpel 1995; Cohen et al. 2008) , little is known about how the activities of groups and political networks specifically shape Latino representation in majority-minority districts. Much less is known about the potential link between political network activity and Latino substantive representation.
This paper examines how political networks and groups influence Latino representation.
Specifically, the paper investigates the puzzle of why some majority-Latino congressional districts attain Latino descriptive representation while others do not, and it examines the role of political networks in yielding representation in these specific districts. The paper argues that political network activity mediates the relationship between Latino population and co-ethnic political representation. Political networks actively recruit candidates in these majority-Latino districts and provide access to important resources that eventually allow the candidates to successfully campaign to their co-ethnic constituents. The paper argues that variation in organization, involvement, and support from political networks explain why some majorityLatino districts are successful at electing co-ethnic representatives and others are not. As such, the paper argues that group activity is critical for yielding Latino descriptive representation. The paper also investigates how political networks matter for how elected representatives that emerge from a majority-Latino district, either Latino or non-Latino, substantively represent their constituents. The paper relies on qualitative evidence from five case studies and an original dataset of all candidates running for open-seats in districts with a Latino population plurality.
The paper finds that in recruiting and sponsoring candidates, organized networks determine whether Latino candidates are successful in their runs for office -or make runs at all-.
Political networks are extremely influential in narrowing down candidate fields when nonLatinos are suspected to run, and even when the presence of too many Latinos in a race might undercut one other. Political parties and interest groups provide critical financial resources that appear to be much more important to succeeding in a majority-Latino open-seat than other types of financial support. Furthermore, the evidence suggests that groups and parties provide effective campaign resources to Latino candidates if these groups are active in the district and support the candidacies of Latinos. Lastly, the evidence suggests that in selecting and influencing the prospects of some Latino candidates over others, political networks also shape the policy agenda that is prioritized by the candidates that win office. The paper builds on emerging research that examines the role of parties and political networks in shaping minority representation.
Latino representation in majority-Latino districts
Studies have found that descriptive representation largely operates as theoretically expected: larger minority populations are more likely to elect minority office holders (Canon 1999; Lublin 1999; Branton 2009; Casellas 2011; Preuhs and Juenke 2011) . As a result, majority-minority districts have been critically important for the success of Latinos winning elected office (Lublin 1997; Barreto, Segura, and Woods 2004; Michelson 2010; Casellas 2011; Preuhs and Juenke 2011) .
However, despite the known influence of demographics for Latino descriptive representation, majority-Latino districts are not always able to elect co-ethnic representatives.
This suggests that the role of demographics might be overstated and that there are understudied factors also shaping Latino descriptive representation, which scholars have recently begun to explore. Juenke and Shah (2015) find that population in majority-Latino districts is not the sole determinant of Latino electoral success. Their findings reveal that Latino descriptive representation is greatly shaped by candidate supply, indicating that candidate strategizing is a significant determinant of when Latinos become candidates (Juenke and Shah 2015) .
These recent findings challenge the traditional take on majority-minority districts and voter-driven theories of representation that have historically focused on the demand side. As these recent findings suggest, Latino representation also depends on the evaluation of future prospects by Latino candidates and possibly other pre-emergence factors such as the activity of political parties and groups also working from the supply side.
Political parties and groups on candidate emergence and success
Accordingly, the literature on candidate emergence has established that the prospects of candidates are directly influenced by the efforts of parties and party elites (Herrnson 1988; Kazee and Thornberry 1990; Herrnson and Gimpel 1995; Cohen et al. 2008) . Elites and parties recruit candidates to run for office (Kazee and Thornberry 1990; Kazee 1994; Maestas, Maisel, and Stone 2005; Broockman 2014 ) and sometimes dissuading certain candidates from running (Canon 1999; Sanbonmatsu 2006 ).
Scholars of political parties and interest groups have also established the important role that these actors play in yielding representation for women and other groups (Sanbonmatsu 2002; Sanbonmatsu 2006; Strolovitch 2008) . Research in this area indicates that parties and elites are instrumental in the recruitment -and non-recruitment-of women to elected office (Niven 1998; Fox and Lawless 2010; Crowder-Meyer 2013) . Based on these findings, we would expect that similar patterns would occur for racial and ethnic minority candidates. However, little work has investigated how political elites and interest groups shape the emergence and success of African American and Latino candidates (Moncrief, Squire, and Jewell 2001; Casellas 2011; Ocampo and Ray 2015 (Maestas, Maisel, and Stone 2005; Crowder-Meyer 2013; Broockman 2014 ) and resource deployment (Desmarais, La Raja, and Kowal 2015) , we can expect that these actors also have clout over which issues are prioritized by the winning candidate. However, due to our limited knowledge on how political networks influence Latino representation, we also lack an understanding of how group and elite interests could influence the type of substantive representation that Latino elected officials provide.
Scholars of minority substantive representation have looked at voting patterns and other behaviors of Latinos already in elected office to determine how their presence in the legislature leads to substantive representation (Canon 1999; Hero and Tolbert 1995; Lublin 1997; Kerr and Miller 1997; Casellas 2007; Minta 2009; Juenke and Preuhs 2012; Rouse 2013; Wallace 2014) .
Considerable research suggests that Latino elected officials represent their co-ethnic constituents through varying legislative mechanisms. Some of these include racial oversight hearings (Minta 2009 ), chairing hearings and addressing issues of housing, civil rights, and social welfare (Ellis and Wilson 2013) , prioritizing Latino issues in committees and co-sponsoring bills tied to Latino interests (Rouse 2013; Wallace 2014 
Theoretical Framework
In order to understand what political network activity suggests for Latino representation in majority-Latino districts, I rely on the group-centric theory from which I extend my argument and testable hypotheses. The group-centric theory proposes that party coalitions and their networks are key to the electoral prospects of candidates because they determine if and when representation can be achieved. The theory argues that groups are largely influential in recruiting candidates and working behind their candidacy (Cohen et al. 2008; Masket 2009; Bawn et al. 2012 ). The theory further proposes that group networks matter for winning elections because they provide critical resources that candidates depend on to be successful (Cohen et al. 2008; Bawn et al. 2012; Desmarais, La Raja, and Kowal 2015) .
The group-centric theory suggests that coalitions and networks made up of policy demanders support candidates conditional on how faithful the candidates are to the policy agenda or preferences of the demanders (Cohen et al. 2008; Koger, Masket, and Noel 2009; Masket 2009; Bawn et al. 2012; Broockman 2014 (Sanbonmatsu 2006; Fox and Lawless 2010; Masket 2009 ). As a result, the organized and visible presence of these networks in a particular district is crucial for candidates' emergence. The recruitment activities of these political networks are equally consequential given that the groups have clout as to which individuals become candidates and which ones to do not.
In addition to being critical for ensuring that certain candidates run in a primary, the group-centric theory also posits that networks are vastly important for candidate success. Support from political networks facilitates access to necessary resources to deploy a successful campaign (Masket 2009; Herrnson 2009; Desmarais, La Raja, and Kowal 2015) . Relying on this theory, I argue that it has serious implications for Latino representation, at least descriptively, but potentially substantively. I argue that in places where networks are not well organized or active, it cannot be expected that Latino candidates will manifest despite there being a large Latino population, or a high demand for these candidates. This is particularly important as it challenges the traditional understanding of majority-Latino districts (Lublin 1997; Michelson 2010; Preuhs and Juenke 2011) , which suggests that a sizable Latino population in a district will yield Latino descriptive representation. I posit that political networks and groups mediate the relationship between Latino constituency and Latino descriptive representation. If political organizations are present and active, we can expect that they will strongly influence Latino candidate emergence and success based on the literature (Masket 2009; Bawn et al. 2012; Ocampo and Ray 2016) . I hypothesize that Latino descriptive representation in majority-Latino districts will largely be a function of the activities that political networks engage in on behalf of their chosen candidate. As suggested by the extant literature on candidate emergence, I
hypothesize that political networks and groups will have a direct influence on which Latino and non-Latino candidates run for office in these majority-Latino districts. Active groups in each district should be closely involved in the recruitment and negative recruitment of candidates.
Moreover, I expect to find that the specific access to resources provided by these political networks should be of great importance for the prospects of the candidates in the districts and for achieving Latino descriptive representation.
I also hypothesize that the activities and clout of political networks should have influence over substantive representation. The literature on interest groups and party networks suggests that groups vet and recruit candidates who are "like them" to have champions for issues that are important to them (Bawn et al. 2012) . Relying on this proposition from the group-centric theory, I expect to find that Latino and non-Latino candidates that emerge in these majority-Latino districts based on support from certain political networks will be agents of the policy demanders that recruited and supported them. In other words, the candidates that emerge should prioritize and advocate on behalf of issues that their group supporters consider to be important. While the literature has found that Latino candidates substantively represent their constituents through formal and informal behaviors (Minta 2009; Rouse 2013; Wallace 2014 ) no work has investigated what role groups and elites play in shaping Latino substantive representation. This paper extends prior work in this area and argues that political network activity shapes the type of substantive representation of the winning candidates in these majority-Latino districts, given how influential the groups are to the success of some candidates over others.
Data and Method
The paper relies on quantitative and qualitative data on congressional contests that had a substantive Latino population. The study focuses particularly on open-seats given that these primaries are less safe and more competitive compared to contests where incumbents are present (Schantz 1980; Grau 1981; Hogan 2003) . As Gaddie and Bullock (2000) were AZ-7 (65%), CA-31 (51%) and CA-35 (67%). Hence, the case studies for 2014 were selected with the criteria that they were open-seats and also Latino-majority districts.
Given that the paper specifically investigates why Latino candidates emerge in some majority-Latino districts and not in others, it was also important to account for variation in whether or not Latino representation was achieved. Two additional cases were selected to match this criterion. These were districts that had a substantial Latino population but no Latino Member 
Findings and Analysis

Overview of Case Studies
I. CA-31, 2012
The 
II. CA-31, 2014
After the 2012 debacle of failing to elect a Latino to Congress, Democrats and political elites pledged to reclaim the seat from Republicans. As it will be detailed in the section to follow, a coalition of Democratic groups, unions, the Democratic Congressional Campaign 
IV. CA-35, 2014
The district is located in California's Inland Empire but also encompasses a portion of the county of Los Angeles. The district includes the cities of Pomona, Ontario, Fontana and Rialto. 
V. AZ-7, 2014
This district is located in Maricopa county and it encompasses parts of Phoenix and and was elected to represent this majority-Latino district.
In the CA-35 case study, the data reveals that unions also played an important role in Norma Torres' congressional campaign and overall candidacy. As multiple sources recalled, the local unions had been supportive of her when she began her political career in the Pomona City Council. A local activist in Pomona credited the unions with making Torres the politician that she became as she was sponsored by the unions to make her first run for the City Council. As this source suggested, Norma won by 40 votes when she ran against Willie E. White. It was evident that she was union person. She was a 9-1-1 operator. She was for AFSCME, for all of them in fact. If you run for office and belong to a union, you are set. Her main union was AFSCME.
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Torres ascended into political office by way of the unions, and the data suggests that had it not been for Torres' union relationship she would have not entered the political pipeline that eventually allowed her to become a candidate in CA-35. LGBT groups.
Various activists, union members and local leaders reported that concern grew among their political networks. As they saw it, one candidate could draw support away from another one and hurt the chances of a given group's preferred candidate. Among those who were the most concerned were the unions and the network supporting Ruben Gallego, since Steve Gallardo presented a potential threat. 18 The UFCW as well as other influencers took it upon themselves to negatively recruit Steve Gallardo and attempted to convince him to run for the vacant Maricopa As the candidate field dwindled in AZ-7, the evidence continued to suggest that through massive campaign support, the unions were crucial to Ruben Gallego's success. Large union support, particularly from the UFCW, meant that, in a low propensity voting district and in a district where there is not going to be millions of dollars involved [they -UFCW members-are] going to be knocking on doors, and convincing the voter. [They are] going to follow-up and collect the ballots, which is still legal to do here in Arizona. 30 days before the election the ballots go out by the county so at that point you can go to the house and knock on the door and say "I am so and so, I would like to ask you if you have turned in your ballot yet, oh you haven't? well I can pick it up and take it to where it needs to go. I can help you fill out the ballot." So, there is some coaching involved. This is a very intense operation.
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As the data indicate, the outcome of AZ-7 was shaped by the unions, the overall coordination of groups, and the influential resources and support to deploy large campaign operations. All these components allowed Ruben Gallego to garner the most votes in the primary and ultimately represent this majority-Latino district in Congress. Evidence from the case studies suggests that group activity shaped the electoral prospects of all candidates in these majority-Latino districts.
In the form of positive (Kazee 1994; Maestas, Maisel, and Stone 2005; Broockman 2014 ) and negative recruitment, (Canon 1999; T. Kazee 1994; Sanbonmatsu 2006 ) political networks had strong influence on who ran and did not run for these majority-Latino open-seats. Additionally, by providing significant campaign resources, access to donors, and activists (Desmarais, La Raja, and Kowal 2015) , political networks were instrumental to Latino representation in the case studies.
Group influence on substantive representation
The case studies suggest that there is an additional mechanism by which groups and parties influence representation in majority-Latino districts, which consists of vetting certain candidates in ways that matter for substantive representation. The candidates that were screened, supported and later emerged successful in each of the case studies, whether they were Latino or not, prioritized different issues. This had a direct influence on the type of substantive representation that their constituents would receive.
Despite being a majority-Latino district, whose population was 52% immigrant, CA-31 Norma, what she really did do is that she has championed union causes. She was always supported the unionization of the local hospital. If you talk to City Hall people who know her record, they will tell you that she is one of the most conservative Democrats around here, but she takes care of the unions because she knows that is her bread and butter. But she has been horrible on issues of immigration. This is where the immigrant community, us, we get really mad at her, because you don't go on Univision, and call people "illegal". Although she is Guatemalan, I don't think she has that affinity. Rigoberta Menchu even denounced her, because we were having issues with the checkpoints and she didn't have the guts to tell the police or act on our behalf.
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Rep. Torres was described as a strategic politician who would vote with the party on certain issues. It was evident that she would be a champion of union causes but was not going to prioritize other issues such as immigration reform.
In AZ-7, a similar pattern emerged. Interest group members, local activists and elites described three of the early candidates as politicians who had different affinities, would prioritize distinct agendas if elected. A leader of a local union explained some of the differences between Steve Gallardo, the candidate who was dissuaded from running, and Ruben Gallego, the eventual winner, At 11 o'clock Sen. Steve Gallardo was marching with the postal workers in Ruben's district because there was a rally last week at the Staples. Sen. Steve Gallardo was there and at the exact same time Ruben Gallego was getting an award from the Chamber of Commerce. We know that indicates not being a very good advocate. [Ruben's] whole model is all about business.
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The behavior exhibited by both candidates, is suggestive of distinct models of representation.
Sen. Gallardo was described as a true community activist. On the other hand, Ruben Gallego was characterized as a strategic politician who at times prioritized fostering business relationships over overseeing important community struggles. Further evidence suggests that the third candidate, Mary Rose Wilcox, would also provide a different type of representation if elected to the U.S. House. One local elite elaborated on the key differences between the candidates in the
The major area of difference [between the three candidates] is on immigration. If you ask all three, Ruben is gonna stay there. He knows the issue very well and is going to stay there. Mary Rose Wilcox, on the other hand, has been arrested by the Sheriff [Joe Arpaio], she's been an activist. It is a different reality when someone's daughter has been deported down in Nogales and you're trying to find her. Mary Rose Wilcox talks about it, about stopping the deportations in a very different way than Ruben Gallego does. Ruben is one of the most 'Democratic party confidants,' he will tow the party line to a greater degree. But Mary Rose Wilcox she is definitely further left.
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In AZ-7, the three candidates would have provided very different types of representation due to their varying styles of legislating and advocating. This case study provides evidence of how political network activity can influence substantive representation. As the previous section noted, the groups involved in this district played a pivotal role in determining the field of candidates and providing resources to preferred candidates. In turn, by helping elect a specific candidate, the groups directly influenced who won and how certain issues would be advocated for. The candidates had different trajectories as politicians, gave preference to some issues over others and would eventually come to prioritize advocacy of divergent issues in Congress.
Financial group support and Latino candidate success
Taken together, the case studies demonstrate that variation in level of involvement of political networks shape the path of Latinos in majority-Latino districts and the type of representation that these candidates might eventually put forth. Evidence from the case studies suggests that these patterns might hold in other majority-Latino districts beyond those where interviews were conducted. However, despite the rich in-depth empirical data offered by the case studies, it is difficult to assess with the case studies alone how generalizable the findings are Latino candidates received on average $103,241 from committees and $610 from parties.
Non-Latino candidates receive on average $49,558 and $1,569 from interest groups and parties respectively. On average, Latino candidates rely on $103,900 from the combined group support (parties and interest groups) and non-Latino candidates relied on average on $51,128. Table 2 provides summary statistics that further compare the contributions of Latino and non-Latino calculate and plot predicted probabilities of success as a function of hypothetical levels of group and individual level contributions (King 1998; King, Tomz, and Wittenberg 2000) . In these simulations, all other covariates are held at their means. to the individual contribution shares. 29 The figure shows a strong positive relationship between group contributions and candidate success. Figure 1 shows that as the share of contributions coming from groups increases, the probability of a Latino candidate winning a primary increases.
To interpret these findings, we interpret them as a probability of a Latino candidate winning a primary given the value of group contributions, while holding all other variables at the mean. For example, a Latino candidate who receives 75% of contributions from groups is 69 percentage points [95% confidence interval (CI) = [54. 8,83.8] ] more likely to win the primary than their counterparts with lower shares of group-level contributions. As the graph suggests, Latino candidates who receive the highest share of group contributions have an 84% predicted probability of winning the primary compared to those receiving the lowest share of group contributions, who have a 14% predicted probability of winning. This overall change in the predicted probability of winning is quite large given that Latino candidates who receive the highest group level contributions are about 70 percentage points more likely to win the primary than a hypothetical candidate who receives the lowest value of group contributions. This change in the predicted probability of success is large and is associated with a change in five times the likelihood of winning. 30 The findings suggest that the positive relationship that group-level support has on electoral success is quite meaningful as it substantially increases the chances of Latino candidates winning their respective primary. Overall, these findings are consistent with the findings from the case studies where groups also play a critical role in the success of Latino candidates through various forms of support. The results here demonstrate that the wielding influence of political networks is observed when analyzing data across all electoral cycles and all congressional races. The quantitative findings, in conjunction with evidence from the case studies, are indicative of the pivotal role that groups and parties play in the electoral success of Latino candidates in majority-Latino districts.
Discussion
The presence of a large Latino constituency in a majority-Latino district is not enough to ensure Latino descriptive representation. While majority-minority districts do increase the likelihood that minority representatives achieve elected office (Canon 1999; Lublin 1999) , it is not always the case that these districts can elect a co-ethnic candidate. This paper presents an explanation to this puzzle. It shows that the prospects of Latinos when running for Congress in majority-Latino districts are strongly tied to the activities of organized groups and parties, and the cooperation -or lack thereof-among these political networks.
There are several mechanisms through which groups influence whether Latino candidates emerge and succeed in an open-seat in a majority-Latino district. First, political networks vet
Latino candidates in majority-Latino districts and thus have an impact on who enters a race.
Second, they are critical in narrowing down candidate fields when certain announced Latino and non-Latino candidates might weaken the chances of one another. To this aim, political networks discourage Latino and non-Latino candidates out of a race by providing attractive incentives.
Lastly, political networks provide substantial financial and other campaign-related resources to ensure that their chosen candidate succeeds. As the paper finds, financial support from groups in these political networks is very influential for the overall success of Latino candidates in majority open-seats.
This paper has serious implications for scholarship on Latino representation, and minority representation more generally, as it provides evidence of how political networks are fundamental agents in the process of achieving minority descriptive representation. A long-established literature on minority representation has focused on the size of the Latino population and majority-minority districts as important factors that yield Latino electoral success (Lublin 1997; Lublin 1999; Barreto, Segura, and Woods 2004; Branton 2009; Michelson 2010; Casellas 2011 ).
However, despite having some of these characteristics in place, Latinos may not attain descriptive representation. That is because, as the findings here indicate, the electoral success of Latinos is intricately tied to the political networks in their districts and the support they receive from these networks. The in-depth qualitative findings allow us to gain a deeper understanding of the ways in which political networks operate in majority-Latino districts and how they mediate the relationship between minority demographics and electoral success.
Existent work has shown that party elites recruit women and minorities to run for office (Niven 1998; Fox and Lawless 2010; Casellas 2011; Crowder-Meyer 2013) . Specifically, Casellas (2011) The findings in this paper further extend recent work by Juenke (2014) and Juenke and Shah (2015) and contribute to our understanding of supply-side determinants of minority representation. In particular, the findings showcase how actors working from the supply side, namely political networks, can influence minority descriptive representation. As prior work has shown, candidate strategizing matters for the eventual supply of Latino candidates. In addition, this paper demonstrates that political elites, groups and their networks also influence the candidate supply.
As the paper has shown, political network group activity also has implications for Latino substantive representation. Latino and non-Latino candidates in each of the case studies exhibited different priorities and affinities towards certain issues. In directly influencing who enters and wins an open-seat in a majority-Latino district, parties and interest groups determine the type of advocacy that constituents will eventually receive. Even if districts achieve Latino descriptive representation, substantive representation will depend on which candidate was vetted, what issues the candidate prioritizes and which group or network the newly elected representative reciprocates to. As such, these findings extend our understanding of how policy demanders active in nomination politics, as theorized in Cohen et al. (2008; S. Masket 2009; Bawn et al. 2012) can influence the substantive representation of racial and ethnic minorities.
Building on the existing literature (Minta 2009; Rouse 2013; Wallace 2014) , this project presents new evidence of how political network activity yields varying levels of substantive representation. While district demographics and partisanship have been found to be predictors of Latino legislator behaviors (Wallace 2014) , the findings suggest that political networks are also closely tied to specific issue prioritization of Latino representatives. Rouse (2013) 
finds that
Arizona legislators have shown divergent ways of voicing opposition to SB1070, a 2010 law considered to be one of the strictest anti-immigration laws. The findings in this paper help us understand why some Latino legislators may choose to channel their opposition in different ways, and which factors influence the "intensity" of Latino legislator efforts toward certain issues over others (Minta 2009 ). This paper suggests that political networks influence Latino substantive representation in an indirect way by influencing the prospects of some Latino candidates who would be distinct advocates of Latino issues. However, it is highly plausible that political networks may also influence the efforts of Latino legislators in a more direct way, which should be further investigated.
Further work is needed to continue to understand the role of political networks and interest groups on minority representation. This paper has primarily focused on Latino representation at the federal level, but future studies should examine how groups and party elites influence the prospects of minorities vying for elected office at varying levels as well as in districts that have changed demographically. Ultimately, this project aims to highlight how understudied factors working from the supply side are related to minority representation. As such, this analysis elucidates the importance of both qualitative and quantitative analysis in helping to uncover the role of political networks on representation in majority-Latino districts. 
